Panpsychism and the nature of consciousness
Episode of the CBC (Canadian public broadcaster) show 'Ideas' on my work on consciousness and panpsychism.
Is consciousness fundamental to reality?
This is one of my favourite podcast interviews I've done, for the excellent Nous podcast.
'secrets of consciousness' debate
Here is the podcast version of the 'Secrets of Consciousness' debate I participated in at the 'How the Light Gets In' festival at Hay on Wye. (The video is on the video page of this site).
god, mind and free will
Skeptic Michael Shermer and I solve the mysteries of God, consciousness and free will, all in a one hour episode of The Psychology Podcast.
Can science explain consciousness?
This one is a more in depth exploration of the cutting edge of the consciousness debate in academic philosophy. I am in discussion with David Papineau (Professor of Philosophy at KCL) on the 'Panpsycast' podcast (which is actually *not* a podcast about panpsychism). David and I have polar opposite views - I am a panpsychist and he is a physicalist - but we have developed our views in discussion with each other. It ended up being a three-parter, which you can access here, here and here...
I was interviewed on consciousness and panpsychism for the 'Thales Well' podcast.
How come consciousness?
Tom McClelland and I were interviewed for this episode of the 'Philosophy Now' podcast. Tom and I have a quite similar view on how to go about investigating consciousness (what I call the 'Consciousness First' approach on my blog), but I'm inclined to panpsychism whilst Tom is inclined to mysterianism: the view that humans are constitutionally incapable of completely understanding the explanation of consciousness.
Private language argument debate
Wittgenstein's 'private language argument' is intended to show that private mental concepts are incoherent, in which case my entire approach to consciousness is confused. I debate the private language argument with my head of department Hanoch Ben-Yami; you can get the slides here and listen to it here: